In continuation of earlier work, where the problem of joint information embedding and lossless compression (of the composite signal) was studied in the absence and in the presence of attacks, here we consider the additional ingredient of protecting the secrecy of the watermark against an unauthorized party, which has no access to a secret key shared by the legitimate parties. In other words, we study the problem of joint coding for three objectives: information embedding, compression, and encryption. Our main result is a coding theorem that provides a single-letter characterization of the best achievable tradeoffs among the following parameters: the distortion between the composite signal and the covertext, the distortion in reconstructing the watermark by the legitimate receiver, the compressibility of the composite signal (with and without the key), and the equivocation of the watermark, as well as its reconstructed version, given the composite signal. In the attack-free case, if the key is independent of the covertext, this coding theorem gives rise to a threefold separation principle that tells that asymptotically, for long block codes, no optimality is lost by first applying a rate-distortion code to the watermark source, then encrypting the compressed codeword, and finally, embedding it into the covertext using a previously proposed embedding scheme. In the more general case, however, this separation principle is no longer valid, as the key plays an additional role of side information used by the embedding unit.
I. INTRODUCTION
I T is common to say that encryption and watermarking (or information hiding) are related but they are substantially different in the sense that in the former, the goal is to protect the secrecy of the contents of information, whereas in the latter, it is the very existence of this information that is to be kept secret.
In the last few years, however, we have witnessed increasing efforts around the combination of encryption and watermarking, which is motivated by the desire to further enhance the security of sensitive information that is being hidden in the host signal. This is to guarantee that even if the watermark is somehow detected by a hostile party, its contents still remain secure due to the encryption. This combination of watermarking and encryption can be seen both in recently reported research work (see, e.g., [1] , [2] , [6] , [8] , [14] , [16] , and references therein) and in actual technologies used in commercial products with a copyright protection framework, such as the CD and the DVD. Also, some commercial companies that provide Internet documents Manuscript received May 2, 2004 ; revised September 5, 2004 . The material in this paper was presented in part at the 7th Information Hiding Workshop, Barcelona have on their website links copyright warning messages, saying that their data are protected by digitally encrypted watermarks (see, e.g., http://genealogy.lv/1864Lancaster/copyright.htm). This paper is devoted to the information-theoretic aspects of joint watermarking and encryption together with lossless compression of the composite signal that contains the encrypted watermark. Specifically, we extend the framework studied in [9] and [10] of joint watermarking and compression, so as to include encryption using a secret key. Before we describe the setting of this paper concretely, we pause to give some more detailed background on the work reported in [9] and [10] .
In [9] , the following problem was studied: Given a covertext source vector , generated by a discrete memoryless source (DMS), and a message , uniformly distributed in , independently of , with designating the embedding rate, we wish to generate a composite (stegotext) vector that satisfies the following requirements: i) Similarity to the covertext (for reasons of maintaining quality), in the sense that a distortion constraint holds, ii) compressibility (for reasons of saving storage space and bandwidth), in the sense that the normalized entropy does not exceed some threshold , and iii) reliability in decoding the message from , in the sense that the decoding error probability is arbitrarily small for large . A single-letter characterization of the best achievable tradeoffs among and was given in [9] , and was shown to be achievable by an extension of the ordinary lossy source coding theorem, giving rise to the existence of disjoint rate-distortion codebooks (one per each possible watermark message) as long as does not exceed a certain fundamental limit. In [10] , this setup was extended to include a given memoryless attack channel , where item iii) above was redefined such that the decoding was based on rather than on , and where, in view of requirement ii), it is understood that the attacker has access to the compressed version of , and so, the attacker decompresses before the attack and recompresses it after. This extension from [8] to [9] involved a different approach, which was in the spirit of the Gel'fand-Pinsker coding theorem for a channel with noncausal side information (SI) at the transmitter [5] . The role of SI, in this case, was played by the covertext.
In this paper, we extend the settings of [9] and [10] to include encryption. For the sake of clarity of the exposition, we do that in several steps.
In the first step, we extend the attack-free setting of [9] : In addition to including encryption, we also extend the model of the 0018-9448/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE watermark message source to be an arbitrary DMS, , independent of the covertext, and not necessarily a binary-symmetric source (BSS) as in [9] and [10] . Specifically, we now assume that the encoder has three inputs (see Fig. 1 ): The covertext source vector , an independent (watermark) message source vector , where may differ from if the two sources operate in different rates, and a secret key (shared also with the legitimate decoder) , which, for mathematical convenience, is assumed to operate at the same rate as the covertext. It is assumed, at this stage, that is independent of and . Now, in addition to requirements i)-iii), we impose a requirement on the equivocation of the message source relative to an eavesdropper that has access to , but not to . Specifically, we would like the normalized conditional entropy to exceed a prescribed threshold (e.g., for perfect secrecy). Our first result is a coding theorem that gives a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms of single-letter inequalities, such that a triple is achievable, while maintaining reliable reconstruction of at the legitimate receiver. A few words are now in order about the secrecy metric , whose evident weakness (even when ) is that it does not rule out sublinear learning rates at the eavesdropper's side. Notwithstanding this weakness, this secrecy metric has been used in many other information-theoretic works on cryptography (see, e.g., [18] , [19] and many others). Perhaps a more natural criterion for security could be the distortion associated with the best estimate that an eavesdropper can get from the cryptogram. Yamamoto [19] has made an attempt to analyze such a criterion, but at the price of a gap between the upper and lower bounds on achievable performance. One obvious fact is that an equivocation level guarantees that this distortion will be lower bounded by , where is the distortion-rate function of the source . So, equivocation and distortion are related in the sense that a certain level of guarantees a desirable distortion level. Another alternative is the stronger notion of secrecy due to Maurer. However, it is considerably more difficult to work with.
Returning to the present work, in the second step, we relax the requirement of perfect (or almost perfect) watermark recon-struction, and assume that we are willing to tolerate a certain distortion between the watermark message and its reconstructed version , that is, For example, if is the Hamming distortion measure then , of course, designates the maximum allowable bit error probability (as opposed to the block error probability requirement of [9] and [10] ). Also, in this case, it makes sense to impose a requirement regarding the equivocation of the reconstructed message , namely, , for some prescribed constant . The rationale is that it is , not , that is actually conveyed to the legitimate receiver, and hence there is an incentive to protect the secrecy of . We will take into account both equivocation requirements, with the understanding that if one of them is superfluous, then the corresponding threshold ( or accordingly) can always be set to zero. Our second result extends the above-mentioned coding theorem to a single-letter characterization of achievable quintuples . As will be seen, this coding theorem gives rise to a threefold separation theorem, that separates, without asymptotic loss of optimality, between three stages: rate-distortion coding of , encryption of the compressed bitstream, and finally, embedding the resulting encrypted version using the embedding scheme of [9] . The necessary and sufficient conditions related to the encryption are completely decoupled from those of the embedding and the stegotext compression.
In the third and last step, we drop the assumption of an attackfree system and we assume a given memoryless attack channel, in analogy to [10] . Again, referring to Fig. 1 , it should be understood that the stegotext is stored (or transmitted) in compressed form, and that the attacker decompresses before the attack and recompresses after (the compression and decompression units are omitted from the figure). As it will turn out, in the case of a memoryless attack, there is an interaction between the encryption and the embedding, even if the key is still assumed independent of the covertext. In particular, it will be interesting to see that the key, in addition to its original role in encryption, serves also as SI that is available to both encoder and decoder (see Fig. 2 ). 1 Also, because of the dependence between the key and the composite signal, and the fact that the content provider (at the encoder side) may wish to store the compressed composite signal at its own end, it is reasonable to let the compressibility constraint correspond also to the conditional entropy of given , that is, private compression as opposed to the previously considered public compression, without the key, which enables decompression but not decryption (when these two operations are carried out by different, remote units). Accordingly, we will consider both the conditional and the unconditional entropies of , i.e., and . Our final result then is a coding theorem that provides a single-letter characterization of the region of achievable six-tuples . Interestingly, this characterization remains essentially unaltered even if there dependency between and is introduced. 2 In this context, the system designer confronts an interesting dilemma regarding the desirable degree of statistical dependence between and , which affects the dependence between and . On the one hand, strong dependence can reduce the entropy of given (and thereby reduce ), and can also help in the embedding process: For example, the extreme case of (which corresponds to private watermarking since the decoder actually has access to the covertext) is particularly interesting because in this case, for , there is no need for any external resources of randomness, in addition to the randomness of that is already available. On the other hand, when there is strong dependence between and , the secrecy of the watermark might be sacrificed since decreases as well. An interesting point, in this context, is that the Slepian-Wolf encoder [15] (see Fig. 2 ) is used to generate, from , random bits that of freedom that can be optimized subject to the given randomness resources.
are essentially independent of (as is generated only after the encryption). All these aspects will be seen in detail in Section IV, and even more so, in Section VI.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: In Section II, we set some notation conventions. Section III will be devoted to a formal problem description and to the presentation of the main result for the attack-free case with distortion-free watermark reconstruction (first step described above). In Section IV, the setup and the results will be extended along the lines of the second and the third steps, detailed above, i.e., a given distortion level in the watermark reconstruction and the incorporation of an attack channel. Finally, Sections V and VI will be devoted to the proof of the last (and most general) version of the coding theorem, with Section V focusing on the converse part, and Section VI-on the direct part.
II. NOTATION CONVENTIONS
We begin by establishing some notation conventions. Throughout this paper, scalar random variables (RVs) will be denoted by capital letters, their sample values will be denoted by the respective lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by the respective calligraphic letters. A similar convention will apply to random vectors and their sample values, which will be denoted with same symbols superscripted by the dimension. Thus, for example, ( -positive integer) will denote a random -vector , and is a specific vector value in , the th Cartesian power of . The notations and , where and are integers and , will designate segments and , respectively, where for , the subscript will be omitted (as above). For (or ) will be understood as the null string. Sequences without specifying indices are denoted by . Sources and channels will be denoted generically by the letter or , subscripted by the name of the RV and its conditioning, if applicable, e.g., is the probability function of at the point is the conditional probability of given , and so on. Whenever clear from the context, these subscripts will be omitted. Information-theoretic quantities like entropies and mutual informations will be denoted following the usual conventions of the information theory literature, e.g., , and so on. For single-letter information quantities (i.e., when or ), subscripts will be omitted, e.g., will be denoted by , similarly, will be denoted by , and so on.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MAIN RESULT FOR STEP 1
We now turn to the formal description of the model and the problem setting for step 1, as described in the Introduction. A source , henceforth referred to as the covertext source or the host source, generates a sequence of independent copies of a finite-alphabet RV, . At the same time and independently, another source , henceforth referred to as the message source, or the watermark source, generates a sequence of independent copies, , of a finite-alphabet RV,
. The relative rate between the message source and the covertext source is message symbols per covertext symbol. This means that while the covertext source generates a block of symbols, say, , the message source generates a block of symbols, (assuming, without essential loss of generality, that is a positive integer). In addition to the covertext source and the message source, yet another source, , henceforth referred to as the key source, generates a sequence of independent copies of a finite-alphabet RV , independently 3 of both and . The key source is assumed to operate at the same rate as the covertext source, that is, while the covertext source generates the block of length , the key source generates a block of symbols as well, . As the probability distribution of the key source is given, its entropy is dictated. The entropy has a dual meaning: It refers both to the available amount of randomness resources, and to the rate at which should be conveyed to the legitimate decoder (i.e., the capacity of the secure channel in between [11] ).
Given and , a block code for joint watermarking, encryption, and compression is a mapping , whose output is referred to as the stegotext or the composite signal, and accordingly, the finite alphabet is referred to as the stegotext alphabet. Let denote a single-letter distortion measure between covertext symbols and stegotext symbols, and let the distortion between the vectors and be defined additively across the corresponding components, as usual. 3 The assumption of independence between fK g and fX g is temporary and made now primarily for the sake of simplicity of the exposition. It will be dropped later.
An
code is a block code for joint watermarking, encryption, and compression, with parameters and , that satisfies the following requirements. 1. The expected distortion between the covertext and the stegotext satisfies
(1)
2. The entropy of the stegotext satisfies
3. The equivocation of the message source satisfies
4. There exists a decoder such that
For a given , a triple is said to be achievable if for every , there is a sufficiently large for which codes exist. The achievable region of triples is the set of all achievable triples . For simplicity, it is assumed 4 that as this upper limit on suffices to achieve perfect secrecy. Our first coding theorem is the following.
Theorem 1: A triple
is achievable if and only if the following conditions are both satisfied: a) ; b) there exists a channel such that: i)
, ii) , and iii) .
As can be seen, the encryption, on the one hand, and the embedding and the compression, on the other hand, do not interact at all in this theorem. There is a complete decoupling between them: While condition a) refers solely to the key and the secrecy of the watermark, condition b) is only about the embedding-compression part, and it is a replica of the conditions of the coding theorem in [9] , where the role of the embedding rate (see the Introduction above), is played by the product . This suggests a very simple separation principle, telling that in order to attain a given achievable triple , first compress the watermark to its entropy, then encrypt bits (out of the ) of the compressed bit string (by bit-by-bit XORing with the same number of compressed key bits), and finally, embed this partially encrypted compressed bit string into the covertext, using the coding theorem of [9] (again, see the Introduction above for a brief description of this).
IV. EXTENSIONS TO STEPS 2 AND 3
Moving on to Step 2, we now relax Requirement 4 in the above definition of an code, and allow a certain distortion between and its reconstruction at the legitimate decoder. More precisely, let denote a finite alphabet, henceforth referred to as the message reconstruction alphabet. Let denote a single-letter distortion measure between message symbols and message reconstruction symbols, and let the distortion between vectors and be again, defined additively across the corresponding components. Finally, let denote the rate-distortion function of the source with respect to (w.r.t.) , i.e.,
It will now be assumed that , for the same reasoning as before.
Requirement 4 is now replaced by the following requirement: There exists a decoder such that satisfies: (6) In addition to this modification of Requirement 4, we add to Requirement 3, a specification regarding the minimum allowed equivocation w.r.t. the reconstructed message (7) in order to guarantee that the reconstructed message is also secure enough. Accordingly, we modify the above definition of a block code as follows: An code is a block code for joint watermarking, encryption, and compression with parameters and that satisfies Requirements 1-4, with the above modifications of Requirements 3 and 4. For a given , a quintuple is said to be achievable if for every , there is a sufficiently large for which codes exist. Our second theorem extends Theorem 1 to this setting.
Theorem 2: A quintuple
is achievable if and only if the following conditions are all satisfied: a) ; b) ; c) there exists a channel such that: i)
As can be seen, the passage from Theorem 1 to Theorem 2 includes the following modifications: In condition c), is simply replaced by as expected. This means that the lossless compression code of , in the achievability of Theorem 1, is now replaced by a rate-distortion code for distortion level . Conditions a) and b) now tell us that the key rate (in terms of entropy) should be sufficiently large to satisfy both equivocation requirements. Note that the condition regarding the equivocation w.r.t. the clean message source is softer than in Theorem 1 as . This is because the rate-distortion code for already introduces an uncertainty of bits per symbol, and so, the encryption should only complete it to the desired level of bits per symbol. This point is discussed in depth in [19] . Of course, by setting (and hence also ), we are back to Theorem 1.
We also observe that the encryption and the embedding are still decoupled in Theorem 2, and that an achievable quintuple can still be attained by separation: First, apply a rate-distortion code to , as mentioned earlier, then encrypt bits of the compressed codeword (to satisfy both equivocation requirements), and finally, embed the (partially) encrypted codeword into , again, by using the scheme of [9] . Note that without the encryption and without Requirement 2 of the compressibility of , this separation principle is a special case of the one in [12] , where a separation theorem was established for the Wyner-Ziv source (with SI correlated to the source at the decoder) and the Gel'fand-Pinsker channel (with channel SI at the encoder).
Here, there is no SI correlated to the source and the role of channel SI is fulfilled by the covertext. Thus, the new observation here is that the separation theorem continues to hold in the presence of encryption and Requirement 2.
Finally, we turn to Step 3, of including an attack channel (see Fig. 1 ). Let be a finite alphabet, henceforth referred to as the forgery alphabet, and let denote a set of conditional probability mass functions (PMFs) from the stegotext alphabet to the forgery alphabet. We now assume that the stegotext vector is subjected to an attack modeled by the memoryless channel (8) The output of the attack channel will henceforth be referred to as the forgery.
It is now assumed and that the legitimate decoder has access to , rather than (in addition, of course, to ). Thus, in Requirement 4, the decoder is redefined again, this time, as a mapping such that satisfies the distortion constraint (6) . As for the equivocation requirements, the conditioning will now be on both and , i.e., and (9) as if the attacker and the eavesdropper were the same party (or if they cooperated), then s/he might access both. In fact, for the equivocation of , the conditioning on is immaterial since is always a Markov chain, but it is not clear that is superfluous for the equivocation w.r.t. since is one of the inputs to the decoder whose output is . Nonetheless, for the sake of uniformity and convenience (in the proof), we keep the conditioning on in both equivocation criteria.
Redefining block codes and achievable quintuples according to the modified requirements in the same spirit, we now have the following coding theorem, which is substantially different from Theorems 1 and 2. ; c) ; d) ; e) .
First, observe that here, unlike in Theorems 1 and 2, it is no longer true that the encryption and the embedding (along with stegotext compression) are decoupled, yet the rate-distortion compression of is still separate and decoupled from both. In other words, the separation principle applies here in a partial manner only. Note that now, although is still assumed independent of , it may, in general, depend on . On the negative side, this dependence causes a reduction in the equivocation of both the message source and its reconstruction, and therefore, replaces in conditions a) and b). On the positive side, on the other hand, this dependence introduces new degrees of freedom in enhancing the tradeoffs between the embedding performance (condition c)) and the compressibility (condition d)).
The achievability of Theorem 3 involves essentially the same stages as before (rate-distortion coding of , followed by encryption, followed, in turn, by embedding), but this time, the embedding scheme is a conditional version of the one proposed in [10] , where all codebooks depend on , the SI given at both ends (see Fig. 2 ). An interesting point regarding the encryption is that one needs to generate, from , essentially random bits that are independent of (and ), in order to protect the secrecy against an eavesdropper that observes and . Clearly, if were given in advance to the encrypting unit, then the compressed bitstring of an optimal lossless source code that compresses , given as SI, would have this property (as if there were any dependence, then this bitstring could have been further compressed, which is a contradiction). However, such a source code cannot be implemented since itself is generated from the encrypted message, i.e., after the encryption. In other words, this would have required a circular mechanism, which may not be feasible. A simple remedy is then to use a Slepian-Wolf encoder [15] that generates bits that are essentially independent of (due to the same consideration), without the need to access the vector to be generated. For more details, the reader is referred to the proof of the direct part (Section VI).
Observe that in the absence of attack (i.e., ), Theorem 2 is obtained as a special case of Theorem 3 by choosing and letting both be independent of , a choice which is simultaneously the best for conditions a)-d) of Theorem 3. To see this, note the following simple inequalities: In conditions a) and b),
. In condition c), by setting , we have
Finally, in condition d), clearly, and since is independent of , then Thus, for , the achievable region of Theorem 3 is a subset of the one given in Theorem 2. However, since all these inequalities become equalities at the same time by choosing and letting both be independent of , the two regions are identical in the attack-free case.
Returning now to Theorem 3, as we observed, is now involved not only in the role of a cipher key, but also as SI available at both encoder and decoder. Two important points are now in order, in view of this fact.
First, one may argue that, actually, there is no real reason to assume that is necessarily independent of . The idea of dropping this independence assumption was suggested also earlier in [13] . In this situation, it is more plausible to think of in the spirit of its new role, namely, as (synthetic) side information, rather than in its original role, i.e., strictly as a cryptographic key (which is normally assumed to be an independent source of randomness at a certain rate), although is still used in order to protect the secrecy of and . The idea then is as follows: If the user has control of the mechanism of generating , then s/he might implement, in general, a channel by using the available independent randomness resources, 5 taking advantage of the randomness of the covertext. This can be done by using the notion of channel simulation (see, e.g., [17] ). Let us assume that this channel is stationary and memoryless, i.e., (11) with the single-letter transition probabilities left as a degree of freedom for design. Given the covertext , one generates using this channel, and then is shared with the legitimate decoder. 6 While so far, we assumed that was independent of , the other extreme is, of course, (corresponding to private watermarking). Note, however, that in the attack-free case, in the absence of the compressibility Requirement 2 (say, ), no optimality is lost by assuming that is independent of , since the only inequality where we have used the independence assumption, in the previous paragraph, corresponds to condition d).
The second point is that in Theorems 1-3, so far, we have defined the compressibility of the stegotext in terms of , which is suitable when the decompression of is public, i.e., without access to . However, since the content provider may wish to store the stegotext (in the presence of ) for possible future use, it may make sense to measure the compressibility of the stegotext also in a private regime, i.e., in terms of the conditional entropy . 5 These randomness resources are, in fact, purely random, independent bits, which can now be redefined as our secret "key," in the original meaning of this term. 6 Note that now there is a distinction between the required available randomness rate, which is H(K j X )=n = H(K j X) [17] , and the rate at which the key must be conveyed to the legitimate decoder, which remains H(K) (as the decoder has no access to X ). This is in contrast to the case of independence between K and X , where these two parameters coincide.
Our last (and most general) version of the coding theorem takes these two points into account. Specifically, let us impose, in Requirement 2, an additional inequality (12) where is a prescribed constant, and let us redefine accordingly the block codes and the achievable region in terms of six-tuples . We now have the following result. ; e) ; f) .
Note that the additional condition, e), is similar to condition d) except for the term . Also, in the joint PMF of we are no longer assuming that and are independent. It should be pointed out that in the presence of the new requirement regarding , it is more clear now that introducing dependence of upon is reasonable, in general. In the case , that was mentioned earlier, the term , in condition c), and the term , in conditions d) and e), both vanish. Thus, both embedding performance and compression performance improve, like in private watermarking.
Finally, a comment is in order regarding the assumption , which implies that cannot exceed either. If this assumption is removed, and even is allowed to exceed , then Theorem 4 can be somewhat further extended. While cannot be further improved if is allowed to exceed (as it already reaches the maximum possible value, , for
), it turns out that there is still room for improvement in . Suppose that instead of one rate-distortion codebook for , we have many disjoint codebooks. In fact, it has been shown in [9] that there are exponentially disjoint codebooks, each covering the set of typical source sequences by jointly typical codewords. Now, if , we can use the excess bits of the compressed key (beyond the bits that are used to encrypt the binary representation of ), so as to select one of codebooks (as long as ), and thus, reach a total equivocation of as long as , or equivalently, . The equivocation level is now the "saturation value" that cannot be further improved (in analogy to for the original source). This means that condition b) of Theorem 4 would now be replaced by the condition (13) But with this condition, it is no longer clear that the best test channel for lossy compression of is the one that achieves , because for the above modified version of condition b), it would be best to have as large as possible (as long as it is below ), which is in partial conflict with the minimization of that leads to . Therefore, a restatement of Theorem 4 would require the existence of a channel (in addition to the existing requirement of a channel ), such that the random variable takes now part in the compromise among all criteria of the problem. This means that in conditions a), c), d), and e) of Theorem 4, should be replaced by , and there would be an additional condition g):
. Condition a), in view of the earlier discussion above, would now be of the form (14) where . Of course, under the assumption that we have used thus far (15) in other words, is always attained by , and so, the dependence on disappears, which means that the best choice of (for all other conditions) is back to be the one that minimizes , which gives us Theorem 4 as is. It is interesting to point out that this additional extension gives rise to yet another step in the direction of invalidating the separation principle: While in Theorem 4 only the encryption and the embedding interacted, yet the rate-distortion coding of was still independent of all other ingredients of the system, here even this is no longer true, as the choice of the test channel takes into account also compromises that are associated with the encryption and the embedding.
Note that this discussion applies also to the classical joint source-channel coding, where there is no embedding at all: In this case, is a degenerate RV (say, , if ), and so, the mutual information terms depending on in conditions c), d), and e), all vanish, the best choice of is (thus, the right-hand side (RHS) in condition c) becomes the capacity of the channel with as SI at both ends), and condition f) may be interpreted as a (generalized) power constraint (with power function ). Nonetheless, the new versions of conditions a) and b) remain the same as in (13) and (14) . This is to say that the violation of the separation principle occurs even in the classical model of a communication system, once security becomes an issue and one is interested in the security of the reconstructed source.
V. PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF THEOREM 4
Let an code be given. First, from the requirement , we have (16) 
where the second inequality comes from the data processing theorem ( is a Markov chain given ) and the last equality comes from the chain rule and the fact that and are independent. Define as a uniform RV over , and . Now, the first term on the RHS of (17) is further lower-bounded in the following manner:
where (18) is due to the chain rule and the fact that is independent of (hence, is trivially a Markov chain), (19) is due to the memorylessness of , (20) is due to the data processing theorem, and (21) follows from the fact that is stationary and so, is independent of . The second term on the RHS of (17) is in turn lower-bounded following essentially the same ideas as in the proof of the converse to the rate-distortion coding theorem (see, e.g., [3] Using the arbitrariness of together with the continuity of , we get condition e) of Theorem 4. Condition d) is derived in the very same manner except that the starting point is the inequality , and when is further bounded from below, in analogy to the chain of inequalities (17) , there is an additional term, , that is in turn lower-bounded in the following manner:
where the first inequality is because of the memorylessness of , and the second inequality comes from the facts that conditioning reduces entropy (in the second term) and that is independent of (again, due to the stationarity of ). This gives the additional term, , in condition d). Condition c) is obtained as follows:
where the first inequality is (23), the first equality is due to the independence between and , the second inequality is an application of [5, Lemma 4] , the third inequality is due to the fact that and (due to the stationarity of ), and the last equality is obtained by adding and subtracting . Again, since this is true for every , it holds also for , due to continuity. As for condition f), we have (30) and we use once again the arbitrariness of . Regarding condition b), we have (31) where the last equality is due to the fact that is, by definition, a function of , and the last inequality is by the hypothesis that the code achieves an equivocation of at least . Dividing by and taking the limit , leads to , which is condition b). Finally, to prove condition a), consider the inequality , that we have just proved, and proceed as follows (see also [19] ):
where the second inequality follows from the hypothesis that the code satisfies , and the third inequality is due to the memorylessness of , the hypothesis that , and the converse to the rate-distortion coding theorem. Now, to see that the second bracketed term is nonnegative, we have the following chain of inequalities:
Combining this with (32), we have (34) Dividing again by , and letting vanish, we obtain which completes the proof of condition a).
To complete the proof of the converse part, it remains to show that the alphabet size of can be reduced to . To this end, we extend the proof of the parallel argument in [10] by using the support lemma (cf. [4] ), which is based on Carathéodory's theorem. According to this lemma, given realvalued continuous functionals on the set of probability distributions over the alphabets , and given any probability measure on the Borel -algebra of , there exist elements of and nonnegative reals, , such that and for every (35)
Before we actually apply the support lemma, we first rewrite the relevant mutual informations of Theorem 4 in a more convenient form for the use of this lemma. First, observe that (36) and (37) (38) For a given joint distribution of , and given and are both given and unaffected by . Therefore, in order to preserve prescribed values of and , it is sufficient to preserve the associated values and . Let us define then the following functionals of a generic distribution over , where is assumed, without loss of generality, to be (39)
Next define (41) Applying now the support lemma, we find that there exists a random variable (jointly distributed with ), whose alphabet size is and it satisfies simultaneously (42) (43) and (44) It should be pointed out that this RV maintains the prescribed distortion level since is preserved. By the same token, and , which depend only on , are preserved as well. This completes the proof of the converse part of Theorem 4.
VI. PROOF OF THE DIRECT PART OF THEOREM 4
In this section, we show that if there exist RVs that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4, then for every there is a sufficiently large for which codes exist. One part of the proof is strongly based on a straightforward extension of the proof of the direct part of [10] to the case of additional SI present at both encoder and decoder. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, the full details are provided here. It should be pointed out that for the attack-free case, an analogous extension can easily be offered to the direct part of [9] .
We first digress to establish some additional notation conventions associated with the method of types [4] . For a given generic finite-alphabet RV (or a vector of RVs taking on values in ), and a vector ( -positive integer), the empirical PMF (EPMF) is a vector , where is the relative frequency of the letter in the vector . Given , let us denote the set of all -typical sequences of length by , or by (if there is no ambiguity regarding the PMF that governs ), i.e., is the set of the sequences such that (45) for every . For sufficiently large , the size of is well known [4] to be bounded by (46) It is also well known (by the weak law of large numbers) that (47) for all sufficiently large. For a given generic channel and for each , the set of all sequences that are jointly -typical with , will be denoted by , Generation of a Rate-Distortion Code: Apply the type-covering lemma [4] and construct a rate-distortion codebook that covers within distortion w.r.t. , using codewords.
Generation of the Encrypting Bitstream: For every , randomly select an index in the set with a uniform distribution. Denote by , the binary string of length that represents this index. (Note that can be interpreted as the output of the Slepian-Wolf encoder for , where plays the role of SI at the decoder [15] .)
Generation of an Auxiliary Embedding Code: We first construct an auxiliary code capable of embedding watermarks by a random selection technique. First, , sequences are drawn independently from for every
. For every such , let us denote the set of these sequences by . The elements of are evenly distributed among bins, each of size (this is possible thanks to condition c) of Theorem 4, provided that the inequality therein is strict). A different (encrypted) message of length bits is attached to each bin, identifying a subcode that represents this message. We denote the codewords in bin number , by . Stegotext Sequence Generation: For each auxiliary sequence (in the above auxiliary codebook of each -typical ), , a set of stegotext sequences , are independently drawn from . We denote this set by . Encoding: Upon receiving a triple , the encoder acts as follows.
If
, let be the binary representation of the index of the rate-distortion codeword for the message source. For , let denote binary representation string of the index of . Let , where , , and , and where denotes modulo addition, i.e., the XOR operation. 7 The binary vector is the (partially) encrypted message to be embedded. Let denote the index of this message. If or , an arbitrary (error) message is generated (say, the all-zero message).
find, in bin number , the first such that is jointly typical, i.e., , and then find the first such that is jointly typical, i.e., . This vector is chosen for transmission. If , or if there is no and such that , an arbitrary vector is transmitted.
Decoding: Upon receiving and , the decoder finds all sequences in such that . If all found belong to the same bin, say, , then is decoded as the embedded message, and then the binary representation vector corresponding to is decrypted, again, by modulo addition of its first bits with . This decrypted binary -vector is then mapped to the corresponding reproduction vector of the rate-distortion codebook for the message source. If there is no such that or if there exist two or more bins that contain such a sequence, an error is declared.
We now turn to the performance analysis of this code in all relevant aspects. For each triple and particular choices of the codes, the possible causes for incorrect watermark decoding are the following.
1.
. Let the probability of this event be defined as . 7 Note that since H(K) is assumed smaller than R (D ), then so is H(K j Y ), and therefore J L.
2.
, but in bin number there is no s.t.
. Let the probability of this event be defined as .
3. and in bin number there is s.t.
, but there is no s.t.
. Let the probability of this event be defined as . 3 . and in bin number there is and such that , but
and in bin no.
there is and such that , and , but there exists another bin, say, no. , that contains s.t. . Let the probability of this event be defined as .
If none of these events occur, the message (or, equivalently, ) is decoded correctly from , the distortion constraint between and is within (as follows from (50)), and the distortion between and its rate-distortion codeword does not exceed . Thus, Requirements 1 and 4 (modified according to (6) , with replacing ) are both satisfied. Therefore, we first prove that the probability for none of the events 1-5 to occur, tends to unity as . The average probability of error in decoding is bounded by
The fact that follows immediately from (47). As for , we have and similarly to can be made as small as desired by an appropriate choice of .
Finally, we estimate as follows:
Now, since . Since for , their sum tends to zero as well, implying that there exist at least one choice of an auxiliary code and related stegotext codes that give rise to the reliable decoding of . Now, let us denote by the total number of composite sequences in a codebook that corresponds to a -typical . Then 
where in the last inequality we have used condition e). For sufficiently small values of (and, hence, of and ), and so, the compressibility requirement in the presence of is satisfied.
We next prove the achievability of . Let us consider the set of -typical key sequences , and view it as the union of -typical sets (i.e., -typical sets with ), , where exhausts the set of all rational PMFs with denominator , and with the property (66) Suppose that we have already randomly selected a codebook for one representative member of each type class using the mechanism described above. Now, consider the set of all permutations from to every other member of . The auxiliary codebook and the stegotext codebooks for every other key sequence, will be obtained by permuting all (auxiliary and stegotext) codewords of those corresponding to according to the same permutation that leads from to (thus preserving all the necessary joint typicality properties). Now, in the union of all stegotext codebooks, corresponding to all typical key sequences, each codeword will appear at least times, which is a lower bound to the number of permutations of which leave a given stegotext codeword unaltered. The total number of stegotext codewords , in all codebooks of all -typical key sequences (including repetitions), is upper-bounded by which is arbitrarily small provided that is sufficiently small and is sufficiently large. Thus, the rate required for public compression of (without the key), which is , is arbitrarily close to , which in turn is upper-bounded by , by condition d) of Theorem 4.
Before we proceed to evaluate the equivocation levels, an important comment is in order in the context of public compression (and a similar comment will apply to private compres-sion): Note that a straightforward (and not necessary optimal) method for public compression of is simply according to its index within , which requires about bits. On the other hand, the converse theorem tells us that the compressed representation of cannot be much shorter than bits (cf. the necessity of condition d) of Theorem 4). Thus, contradiction between these two facts is avoided only if (71) or, equivalently (72) This means that any achievable point corresponds to a choice of random variables that must inherently satisfy (72). This observation will now help us also in estimating the equivocation levels.
Consider first the equivocation w.r.t. the reproduction, for which we have the following chain of inequalities:
where (73) is based on condition b), (74) is due to the memorylessness of , (75) follows from the fact that is a Markov chain, (76) is due to the sufficiency of condition d) (that we have just proved) and the necessity of condition e), and vanishes as due to the continuity of . Comparing the leftmost side and the rightmost side of the above chain of inequalities, we see that to prove that is essentially at least as large as , it remains to show that is small, say (78) for large . We next focus then on the proof of (78).
First, consider the following chain of inequalities:
where the second inequality follows from the fact that is a function of and the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. As for the second term of the RHS, we have by Fano's inequality for large enough (80) as is the probability of error associated with the Slepian-Wolf decoder that estimates from its compressed version and the "SI" . As for the first term of the RHS of (79), we have (81) It remains to show that as well. In order to show this, we have to demonstrate that for a good code, once is given, there is very little uncertainty with regard to , which is the index of the bin.
To this end, let us suppose that the inequality in (72) is strict (otherwise, we can slightly increase the allowable distortion level and thus reduce ). As we prove in the Appendix, for any given (arbitrarily small) in the code of that appears in more than bins (82) that is, a double-exponential decay. The probability of the union of these events across all representatives of all will just be multiplied by the number of in , which is polynomial, and hence will continue to decay double-exponentially. Let us define then the event in the stego-codebook of some that appears in more than bins as yet another error event (like the error events 1-5) that occurs with very small probability. Assume then, that the randomly selected codebook is "good" in the sense that no stegovector appears in more than bins, for any of the representatives . Now, given , how many candidate bins (corresponding to encrypted messages ) can be expected at most? For a given , let us confine attention to the -conditional type class (key sequences outside this set cannot have in their codebooks, as they are not jointly -typical with ). The conditional -type class can be partitioned into conditional -type classes , where exhausts the allowed -tolerance in the conditional distribution around , in the same spirit as before. Now, take an arbitrary representative from a given , and consider the set of all permutations that lead from to all other members of . Obviously, the stego-codebooks of all those have exactly the same configuration of occurrences of as that of (since these permutations leave unaltered), therefore, they belong to exactly the same bins as in the codebook of , the number of which is at most , by the hypothesis that we are using a good code. In other words, as scans , there will be no new bins that contain relative to those that are already in the codebook of . New bins that contain can be seen then only by scanning the other conditional -types within , but the number of such conditional -types does not exceed the total number of conditional -types, which is upper-bounded, in turn, by [4] . Thus, the totality of stego-codebooks, for all relevant cannot give more than distinct bins altogether. In other words, for a good codebook (83) which is less than for an appropriate choice of and for large enough .
Finally, for the equivocation w.r.t. the original message source, we have the following:
where the first inequality is due to the fact that that we have just shown, and the third is due to the memorylessness of and the fact that the rate-distortion codebook size is and so, . Now, the second bracketed expression on the RHS is the same as in (33), where in the case of this specific scheme, both inequalities in (33) become equalities, i.e., this expression vanishes. This is because in our scheme, is a Markov chain (and so, the first inequality of (33) is tight) and because (as is a deterministic function of ), which makes the second inequality of (33) tight. As a result, we have (85)
where we have used condition a). This completes the proof of the direct part.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We have analyzed optimum tradeoffs between several figures of merit pertaining to the performance of a system that combines watermarking, compression, and encryption. We have also characterized the (high-level) structure of codes that asymptotically achieve the performance limits under various degrees of generality of the underlying assumptions.
To summarize, the main ideas that were developed in this work, both in the general level and in the technical level, are as follows.
1. The separation priniciple falls apart once an attack channel is introduced. In particular, the fact that the cryptographic key plays the additional role of SI is an intesresting phenomenon. Moreover, as more generalilty is added to the model, the separation principle "collapses" in steps: First, the encryption and the embedding become coupled, but the rate-distortion compression is still separate, and then, in another step of enhancing the generality, the rate-distortion code becomes coupled as well with the other parts of the encoder. 2. In many problems where the separation theorem fails (e.g., in network situations, or when there is dependence between the source and the channel), there are no closed-form single-letter expressions for the achievable region, and optimal coding schemes are not known. The situation in this paper is different: even when separation fails, still, single-letter expressions are available (cf. Theorems 3, 4) and asymptotically optimum coding schemes are offerred (at least in the random coding sense). 3. There are interesting tradeoffs with regard to the desired degree of statistical dependency between the key and the stegotext. 4. A Slepian-Wolf encoder is harnessed in order to extract purely random bits for encryption, which are independent of , in order to circumvent the problem that is not yet available in the encryption stage. 5. The security of is taken into account as an additional criterion. 6. The security of is enhanced by using extra key bits to control the choice of the rate-distortion code, by using the fact that there are about distinct codebooks. 7. The random selection of a codebook is carried out for only one "representative" in each type class, and then the codebook for every other in the same type class is constructed by permuting the codevectors according to the permutations that lead from to . This idea proves useful both in estabilishing the achievability of the public compression rate and in proving the achievability of the desired security.
A few leftover problems, to be considered in future work, are as follows.
1. In view of the findings of this work, it would be desirable to conduct a more thorough investigation and to gain understanding with regard to conditions under which the separation principle holds here, and in more general frameworks. In particular, it would be interesting to identify all the factors in the system that affect the validity of the separation principle. In this paper, we identified only one such factor-the presence of a nontrivial (memoryless) attack channel. 2. Replacing the present secrecy metric by a stronger one (referring to the discussion in the Introduction).
3. Relaxing the assumption that the channel from to is memoryless. 4. Taking into account requirements on the secrecy of the covertext (in addition or instead of the secrecy of the watermark and its reconstruction).
APPENDIX
Proof of (82): The probability of obtaining in a single random selection within the codebook of is given by
where the first factor in the RHS of (A1) is the probability of having a that is typical with and (a necessary condition for this to generate the given ), the second factor is the probability of selecting a given in the random selection of the steogtext code, and where (A3) It now follows that the probability for at least one occurrence of among the stegowords corresponding to a certain bin, in the codebook of , is upper-bounded (using the union bound) by (A4)
We are interested to upper-bound the probability that a given appears as a stegoword in more than bins in the codebook of , for a given . For , let be the indicator function of the event appears as a stegoword in bin number at least once Then, clearly are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with . Therefore,
where for , the function designates the binary divergence (A6) which decays double-exponentially rapidly with . While this inequality holds for a given , the probability that for some would be upper-bounded, using the union bound, by , which still decays double-exponentially. Thus, with very high probability, the random selection of stegovectors, for , is such that no stego-codevector appears in more than bins.
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